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Effects in Words and Arithmetic
Equations: Robust Priming
Regardless of Color or Response
Hand Change
Ailsa Humphries, Zhe Chen* and Ewald Neumann
Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
Previous studies have shown that stimulus repetition can lead to reliable behavioral
improvements. Although this repetition priming (RP) effect has been reported in a
number of paradigms using a variety of stimuli including words, objects, and faces,
only a few studies have investigated mathematical cognition involving arithmetic
computation, and no prior research has directly compared RP effects in a linguistic
task with an arithmetic task. In two experiments, we used a within-subjects design
to investigate and compare the magnitude of RP, and the effects of changing the
color or the response hand for repeated, otherwise identical, stimuli in a word and
an arithmetic categorization task. The results show that the magnitude of RP was
comparable between the two tasks and that changing the color or the response hand
had a negligible effect on priming in either task. These results extended previous findings
in mathematical cognition. They also indicate that priming does not vary with stimulus
domain. The implications of the results were discussed with reference to both facilitation
of component processes and episodic memory retrieval of stimulus–response binding.
Keywords: repetition priming, arithmetic, words, stimulus–response binding, facilitation of component processes
INTRODUCTION
Repetition priming (RP) refers to improved processing of a stimulus when that stimulus, or a
similar one, is repeated compared to when it appears the first time. There are two commonly used
paradigms: the prime-probe couplet paradigm, in which a prime, whose response may or may not
be required, is followed almost immediately by a probe (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Reynvoet et al.,
2002; Kunde et al., 2003); and the study-test block paradigm, in which both the study and test
blocks consist of a series of trials, and a response is required on every trial (e.g., Dobbins et al.,
2004; Horner and Henson, 2009, 2011; Salimpoor et al., 2010). In both paradigms, the relationship
between the prime and probe or between items in the study and test blocks is manipulated. The
manipulation can concern various aspects of a stimulus, including identity (e.g., the same stimulus
is repeated vs. a new stimulus is used), representational form (e.g., a numeral presented in the
same notation vs. in different notations such as changing from an Arabic digit to a word form),
classification (e.g., a stimulus classified in the same way vs. in different ways such as changing
from “bigger than a shoebox” to “smaller than a shoebox”), and response (e.g., using the same
hand to respond vs. switching to a different hand to respond). Although the magnitude of RP can
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be influenced by the similarity between the primed/studied
items and the unprimed/new items, there is evidence that RP is
remarkably robust, indicating that RP can occur at multiple levels
of abstraction depending on task demand (see Henson et al.,
2014, for a review). The presence of RP shows that behavior is not
just driven by the current stimulus situation but is also affected
by what has been processed in previous stimulus situations
(Schacter, 1990).
There are two main theoretical perspectives that account for
RP. The first perspective emphasizes the role of facilitation of
component processes that give rise to a response when a stimulus
is repeated. The facilitation can be due to changes in neural
responses related to stimulus, task, and/or response features,
enabling more efficient processing when the same or a similar
stimulus is subsequently presented (see Grill-Spector et al., 2006,
for a review). The second perspective emphasizes direct binding
between a stimulus and response during encoding, and the role of
episodic memory during retrieval. RP is explained as the result of
a match (or mismatch) between a retrieving cue upon perceiving
a stimulus and the context in which that same stimulus, or a
similar one, was encountered previously. Theories belonging to
this perspective include the instance theory (Logan, 1988, 1990),
the event file theory (Hommel, 1998, 2004), and the action-trigger
theory (Kunde et al., 2003), among others. Although their details
differ, these theories all recognize, to various degrees, multiple
levels of binding (e.g., binding among various stimulus features,
locations, and the actions performed on the stimulus).
Most previous studies on RP used stimuli such as words,
objects, and/or faces (e.g., Logan, 1988; Dobbins et al., 2004;
Horner and Henson, 2009, 2011, 2012; Valt et al., 2015). Not
many studies used numbers as stimuli (e.g., Dehaene et al.,
1998; Naccache and Dehaene, 2001; Reynvoet et al., 2002; Kunde
et al., 2003), and even fewer required participants to perform
arithmetic computation on the numbers (e.g., Sciama et al.,
1999; Salimpoor et al., 2010; Scheepers et al., 2011; Scheepers
and Sturt, 2014). As the study of RP can reveal the underlying
learning mechanisms that give rise to the processing efficiencies
gained from stimulus repetition, it is important to know whether
the mechanisms that underlie RP with conceptually rich stimuli
such as words and objects are the same as those that underlie
mathematical cognition. This question is particularly important
for the contemporary society because of the growing reliance
on technology and the introduction of computer coding as a
core curriculum area within primary school education in many
countries.
Although abstract numerical information and the more
conceptually elaborative linguistic information appear to be
represented in similar associative networks (Ashcraft and
Battaglia, 1978; Ashcraft and Stazyk, 1981) and rely on a common
underlying syntactic structure (Scheepers et al., 2011; Scheepers
and Sturt, 2014), to date, no direct comparison has been
undertaken in terms of whether RP effects are also equivalent
in tasks that require semantic categorization of words and
arithmetic categorization of equations. Furthermore, whereas
long-lag RP has been reported in a number of word tasks (e.g.,
Scarborough et al., 1977; Bentin and Moscovitch, 1988; Kersteen-
Tucker, 1991), so far, only one study has explored long-lag RP
(an average lag of 16 trials) in a math task (Salimpoor et al.,
2010). In that study, participants performed a three-operand
arithmetic verification task in some blocks (e.g., to determine
whether “3 + 5 − 4 = 4” is correct or incorrect) and a visual
search task in the other blocks (e.g., to judge whether “4 @ 3
& 2 o 5” contained the digit ‘5’ or not) in a study-test block
design, and significant RP was found in response latencies in
both tasks. As long-lag RP in mathematical cognition has not
been studied very much, it is important to find out whether the
results reported in Salimpoor et al. (2010) could be generalized to
a similar task.
In the two experiments reported below, we used a within-
subjects design to compare the magnitude of RP in both a word
and a math task. We manipulated stimulus identity and color
in Experiment 1, and motor action in Experiment 2. These
experiments were designed with the following objectives in mind:
(1) to compare the magnitude of RP between a word and a
math task, and to determine whether RP would be affected to a
similar degree in the two tasks by a change in a task irrelevant
feature dimension (Experiment 1) or by a change in motor action
(Experiment 2); and (2) to investigate whether RP in a two-
operand arithmetic categorization task could survive an average
of 15 intervening trials.
An important feature in most previous studies on RP is the
use of an absolute-differences method of analysis in calculating
the results (e.g., Sciama et al., 1999; Horner and Henson, 2009).
In this method, the data from the prime trials or study blocks
are not included in the analysis of RP. Instead, only those data
from the probe trials or test blocks are analyzed. Thus, RP is
based on comparing the absolute difference in RT and accuracy
between the experimental (i.e., the primed or studied) condition
and the control (i.e., the non-primed or studied) condition.
This method of analysis fits with the conception on RP as a
phenomenon where studied (primed) items are more efficiently
and effectively responded to than non-studied (un-primed) items
(Schacter, 1990). However, given that theories of RP attempt
to explain current processing as a result of prior processing, it
would seem important that all characteristics of the initial state
be taken into consideration and, where possible, analysis be based
on the relative difference in RT and accuracy from study and
test trials. For example, in a study-test block design, instead of
directly comparing the performance in the studied test block
with that in the unstudied test block (i.e., the absolute difference
method), one first calculates two difference scores: one between
the study and test blocks for the studied condition, and the other
between the study and test blocks for the unstudied condition.
Thus, whereas the absolute difference method is built on the
assumption that performance does not differ across conditions
in the study blocks, the relative difference method takes into
account (empirically) performance in these blocks. As variations
across conditions during study are more likely to be captured
in the relative difference method rather than in the absolute
difference method as suggested by recent findings of anti-priming
(e.g., Marsolek et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2017), the relative
difference method provides a more complete picture of RP. In
the experiments reported here, we used this method in our data
analyses.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 investigated whether RP could be found in a
blocked study-test design with an average lag of 15 intervening
trials in both a word and arithmetic categorisation task, and
whether changes in color, a task irrelevant feature, would affect
the magnitude of RP to a similar degree in the two tasks.
Previous research on memory has shown that performance is
influenced by the match in mental operations required of the task
at study and the task at test. A task can be classified as being
primarily conceptually driven or data driven (Blaxton, 1989).
A conceptually driven task (or conceptual task) requires the
processing of the semantic information of a stimulus. In contrast,
a data driven task (or perceptual task) requires the processing of
the perceptual features of a stimulus. According to the principle
of transfer-appropriate processing (Morris et al., 1977; Blaxton,
1989; Roediger et al., 1989), memory performance is improved
to the extent the mental operations performed at study overlap
with those performed at test. Consistent with this principle, RP is
typically found when the type of processing involved at study is
evoked at test (e.g., Blaxton, 1989; Mulligan, 1996; Franks et al.,
2000; Spataro et al., 2011). Furthermore, when a specific type
of processing (e.g., the processing of perceptual features) is not
required at test, changes in stimulus features relating to that type
of processing between study and test do not affect the magnitude
of priming (Blaxton, 1989).
In Experiment 1, in both the study and test blocks, participants
categorized a word (e.g., tiger) as referring to an animal or an
object in the word task, and they determined whether the answer
to an arithmetic equation (e.g., 5 + 12) was an odd or an even
number in the math task. As both tasks were conceptual tasks
that relied primarily on the processing of semantic information, a
change in the ink color of a stimulus, a task irrelevant perceptual
feature, from study to test should not influence RP very much so
long as the identity of the stimulus remained the same between
study and test.
While it was unknown how a change in study might affect
priming in test in a linguistic task relative to an arithmetic
task, there is evidence for structural priming between the two
domains (e.g., Scheepers et al., 2011; Scheepers and Sturt, 2014).
Scheepers and Sturt (2014, Experiment 1) used a prime-probe
couplet paradigm, with the prime being an arithmetic equation
that had a left- or right-branching structure (e.g., 3 × 4 + 6
vs. 3 + 4 × 6), and the probe a linguistic expression that
also had a left- or right-branching structure (e.g., alien monster
movie vs. lengthy monster movie). The task was to solve the
equation and then to rate the sensicality, on a 1–5 scale, of
the linguistic expression. A robust priming effect was found.
Participants rated the linguistic expressions as being more
sensical when the prime and probe had the same structure
compared with when the two had different structures. In a
subsequent experiment, structural priming was again found when
the prime was a linguistic expression and the probe was an
arithmetic equation. These results suggest that arithmetic and
language share syntactic representations. They also raise the
possibility that if we manipulate an aspect of a stimulus such as
color between study and test in both a word task and a math




The study reported here received prior ethical approval from
The University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee.
The committee approved the consent form and experimental
procedure. Written consent was obtained from the participants.
All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants
Thirty-one participants were recruited from the University of
Canterbury (9 males and 22 females) between the ages of 17 and
44 years (M = 20.8 years, SD = 5.7 years). All the participants
were enrolled in a first year psychology course and participated
in return for course credit.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiments were presented on a PC with a 50-cm × 30-cm
monitor in width and height. E-Prime 2.0 with a refresh rate of
60 ms was used to generate the stimuli and to collect responses.
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room. The
viewing distance was approximately 60 cm.
Each trial consisted of a central fixation followed by a word
or an arithmetic equation presented at the center of the screen.
The fixation was a black cross that extended 0.06 degrees of visual
angle in both length and width. Both the word and the arithmetic
equation were written in Courier New, font size 40. Depending
on the experiment condition, the stimuli were either black or
colored. In the latter condition, the colors used were black, blue,
cyan, green, lime, magenta, maroon, navy, olive, orange, purple,
and red.
In the word task, which required participants to determine
whether the word referred to an animal or an object, the stimulus
set consisted of 184 words that varied in length from three to
nine letters.1 Half of them referred to an animal and half to a
household object. In the math task, which required participants
to determine whether the answer to the equation was an odd
or an even number, the stimulus set consisted of 216 equations.
All equations were in the format of a single digit number plus
a two-digit number, with half of them starting with the single
digit number (e.g., 5 + 15) and the other half starting with the
double-digit number (e.g., 16 + 4). Half of the equations had an
odd answer and half an even answer. Within these constraints, in
both the word and the math task, stimuli were randomly selected
to each condition for each participant.
Design and Procedure
The experiment used a 2 (task: word vs. math)× 2 (feature: ID vs.
color) × 2 (condition: same vs. change) within-subjects design.
1The words used in the present experiments were not taken from any published
database, and no attempt was made to match the frequency of words in different
experimental conditions. However, this should not influence the results of the
experiments because the stimuli were randomly selected to each condition for each
participant.
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Participants completed both tasks in one sitting and each task
included two sessions: an ID session, in which the identity of
the stimulus was manipulated (ID-same vs. ID-change), and a
color session, in which the color of the stimulus was manipulated
(color-same vs. color-change). Only one stimulus dimension
varied in each session. In other words, all stimuli had the same
color in the ID session and all stimuli had the same identity in
the color session. In both sessions, only stimulus identity was task
relevant while color was task irrelevant. The order of the two tasks
and the two sessions was counterbalanced across participants.
Both tasks followed the same procedure, and within each task
the two sessions followed the same blocked design with four
rounds of study-test cycles. Each of these four cycles consisted of
two mini-blocks of eight study words/equations followed by two
mini-blocks of eight test words/equations. This gave a total of 16
mini-blocks (8 study mini-blocks plus 8 test mini-blocks), or 32
trials per study-test cycle and 128 trials per session, for a total of
256 trials in each task.
In the ID session, all stimuli were black. In the ID-same
condition, the words or equations used in the study phase were
re-used in the test phase. In the ID-change condition, different
words or equations were used in the study and test phases. No
words or equations were used twice within a task except to
fulfill the repetition condition. In addition, the set of words or
equations used in the ID session was not re-used in the color
session, so there was no overlap of stimuli between the two
sessions.
In the color session, all words or equations were presented
in colored font and the identity of the words or equations in
the study block was always repeated in the test block. In the
color-same condition (8 mini-blocks in total, with 4 mini-blocks
in the study phase and 4 in the test phase), the stimuli had the
same color in both the study phase and the test phase. This
resulted in the use of four different colors, one for each study-test
cycle. In the color-different condition (8 mini-blocks in total,
with 4 mini-blocks in the study phase and 4 in the test phase),
the stimuli had one color in the study phase but a different
color in the test phase. This led to the use of eight different
colors, with a unique color in every mini-block. No colors were
used twice between any two mini-blocks within a task except to
fulfill the repetition condition. Within each study-test cycle, the
order of presentation of individual stimuli in a mini-block was
always randomized and the order of the two mini-blocks at test
was also randomized. Hence, the maximum possible lag between
presentations of the same stimuli was 30 trials and the minimum
was zero, with an average lag of 15 intervening trials. Figure 1
shows the four conditions as they relate to the study and test
cycles in both the ID and color sessions for the word task. The
conditions were the same for the math task.
Each trial began with a fixation cross for 1,000 ms, followed
by a target display for 120 ms, and then a blank screen until
a response was made. The inter-trial stimulus interval was
1,000 ms. The participants used the index and middle fingers
of their right hand to press one of the two labeled keys on a
computer keyboard. In the word task, the participants pressed
the “o” key if the word referred to an animal and the “p” key if
the word referred to an object. In the math task, they pressed the
“o” key if the answer to the equation was an odd number and the
“p” key if it was an even number.
Each participant first completed a brief practice block of 32
trials for each task before proceeding to the experiment proper.
None of the stimuli used in the practice block were used in
the experimental blocks. All participants were encouraged to
take a break between tasks and between the two sessions within
each task. The total amount of time for the experiment was
approximately 40 min.
Results and Discussion
Data exceeding 3 SD (both above and below) from each
individual participant’s mean RT were excluded. This resulted
in the exclusion of less than 2% of the data. Data from five
participants were also excluded due to an error rate exceeding
25% in one or more conditions, and data from three further
participants were excluded due to their median RT being
more than 3 SD above the average of the median RTs for all
participants.
The means of median RTs and error rates for the remaining
participants are shown in Table 1 for the word task and Table 2
for the math task. For each participant, we calculated the
difference score between the study and test blocks (Study – Test)
for each condition, and these difference scores were then used to
compute RP. Hence, the statistical analyses and the interpretation
of the results reported below are based on the data using the
relative-difference method of analysis.
Figures 2, 3 show the mean of the difference score in RT
in each condition for the word and the math task, respectively.
A 2 (task: word vs. math) × 2 (feature: ID vs. color) × 2
(condition: same vs. change) repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the RT data (i.e., the
difference scores between the study and the test blocks). The
results showed that the intercept was significantly different from
zero, F(1,22) = 32.87, MSE = 7703, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.60. As
we used difference scores in the analysis, this result indicated
that RTs were faster at test than at study. There was also a main
effect of task, F(1,22) = 4.51, MSE = 6148, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.17,
suggesting a larger RT improvement in the math mask (49 ms)
than in the word task (25 ms). In addition, feature and condition
interacted, F(1,22) = 8.96, MSE = 8268, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.29.
For the ID session, the magnitude of difference in RT between
the study and test blocks was significantly larger in the ID-same
condition (64 ms) than in the ID-different condition (−1 ms),
indicating RP. For the color session, there was no significant
difference in priming between the color-same condition (35 ms)
and the color-different condition (50 ms). The latter result
indicates no reduction in priming regardless of whether there was
a color change from the study to the test block. No other effects
reached significance.
A similar ANOVA was conducted on the error rates.
The intercept was again significantly different from zero,
F(1,22) = 5.74, MSE = 30, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.21, indicating
more accurate responses at test than at study. The main
effect of task was significant, F(1,22) = 17.81, MSE = 16,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.45, suggesting that the participants made more
improvement between the study and test blocks in the math task
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 January 2018 | Volume 8 | Article 2326
fpsyg-08-02326 January 9, 2018 Time: 17:53 # 5
Humphries et al. Comparing RT in Words and Arithmetic Tasks
FIGURE 1 | A schematic representation for the ID and color sessions in the word classification task in Experiment 1. The allocation of words to condition and the
order in which the words were presented within each of the study and test blocks was randomized. Note that the identity of the stimuli in the color session was
always the same between the study and test blocks regardless of whether there was a change in color between the two blocks.
(2.2%) than in the word task (−0.3%). No other effects were
significant.
The most important finding in Experiment 1 is the remarkable
similarity in the pattern of data between the word and math
tasks. In both tasks, a significant RP effect was found in the
ID session, indicating that RP can survive an average lag of 15
intervening trials in both tasks. The finding of the RP in the math
task extended the results of Salimpoor et al. (2010), who used a
three-operand arithmetic verification task and found significant
long-lag RP that survived an average of 16 intervening trials.
The improvement in RT from the study to the test block may
appear to be larger in the math task (49 ms with an error rate of
2.2%) than in the word task (25 ms with an error rate of 0.3%).
TABLE 1 | Means of median reaction times, expressed in milliseconds (ms), and
percentage of errors (%) for the classification of words in Experiment 1.
Reaction time (ms) Percentage error (%)
Study Test Study Test
M SD M SD M SD M SD
ID-same 619 77 584 58 3.2 5.1 3.5 4.1
ID-change 620 81 625 77 3.7 4.6 5.1 6.7
Color-same 614 63 584 62 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.8
Color-change 632 81 592 56 5.1 5.2 4.9 5.2
TABLE 2 | Means of median reaction times, expressed in milliseconds (ms), and
percentage of errors (%) for the classification of equations in Experiment 1.
Reaction time (ms) Percentage error (%)
Study Test Study Test
M SD M SD M SD M SD
ID-same 1,186 211 1,093 233 8.5 5.9 6.8 5.9
ID-change 1,209 241 1,205 276 9.6 6.9 7.8 5.1
Color-same 1,135 259 1,095 264 8.5 6.9 7.7 6.4
Color-change 1,142 251 1,081 255 9.4 6.5 4.8 3.6
FIGURE 2 | RT differences between the study and test blocks in the word
classification task as a function of feature and condition in Experiment 1. Error
bars show ±1 standard deviation of the mean. A positive number indicates
faster RT in the test block than in the study block. A negative number
indicates slower RT in the test block than in the study block.
FIGURE 3 | RT differences between the study and test blocks in the math
task as a function of feature and condition in Experiment 1. Error bars show
±1 standard deviation of the mean.
However, the difference in RT was largely due to the math task
taking substantially longer to complete (mean RT = 1,143 ms)
than the word task (mean RT = 609 ms). In terms of percentage
change from study to test, which is a more accurate measure for
RP in the present paradigm, the improvement in performance
was 4% in both tasks, indicating that the magnitude of RP was
comparable in the two tasks. With regard to the difference in
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error rates, the overall error rate in the word task (4%) was lower
than that in the math task (7.9%). The comparable performance
between the study and test blocks in the word task could therefore
be caused by a ceiling effect. There was not much room for
performance to improve from study to test. Taken together, these
results showed very little difference in the magnitude of priming
between the word and math tasks.
Color change had no discernible effect on the magnitude of
priming in either the word or the math task. These results are
consistent with prior research showing that RP arises primarily
from task relevant features (Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1996;
Hillstrom, 2000; but see Huang et al., 2004). They are also in
line with the findings of several previous memory studies that
involved a color change in stimuli from study to test (e.g.,
Szymanski and MacLeod, 1996; MacDonald and MacLeod, 1998;
Newell et al., 2008; but see Stone et al., 2000). Szymanski and
MacLeod (1996) showed their participants words printed in
different colors in the study phase. In one block (the reading
condition), the participants read each word aloud (a task that
evokes both perceptual and conceptual processing). In the other
block (the color naming block), they named the ink color of
each word (a task that evokes primarily perceptual processing).
In the test block, in which all stimuli were printed in white,
half the participants completed a memory recognition task
while the other half a lexical decision task. For the memory
recognition task, which is a task that relies heavily on conceptual
processing, performance was better for the words that had
appeared in the reading condition compared with the color
naming condition. However, for the lexical decision task, which is
a task that evokes predominantly perceptual processing because
it can be performed on the basis of overall lexical familiarity
without complete lexical identification, at least for common
words (Grainger and Jacobs, 1996), performance was comparable
for words that had appeared in the reading and the color
naming conditions. These and similar results reported by other
researchers (e.g., MacDonald and MacLeod, 1998; Newell et al.,
2008) are consistent with the findings of Experiment 1 in the
present study. Together, they indicate that a change in stimulus
color from study to test do not necessarily affect the magnitude
of priming so long as color is not a task relevant attribute
at test.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 showed no reduction in RP in either the word
or the math task when there was a color change between
the study and the test. In Experiment 2, we investigated the
effect of motor action on RP in the two tasks. Instead of
manipulating ID or color, we manipulated the response hand
so that participants either used the same hand to press the
response keys in both the study and test blocks, or switched hand
between the study and the test block. The goal of the experiment
was to determine whether a change in response hand would
affect RP in the math task, and if so, whether the magnitude of




Twenty-seven new participants from the same participant pool
were recruited from the University of Canterbury (5 males and
22 females) between the ages of 17 and 59 years (M = 21 years,
SD= 8.3 years) in return for either course credit or a $10 voucher.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Both the apparatus and stimuli were the same in Experiment
2 as those in Experiment 1 except for the following three
differences. First, the test blocks always contained the same words
or equations as the study blocks, and all stimuli were presented in
black. Thus, unlike Experiment 1, there was no change in identity
or color between the study and test blocks. As in the previous
experiment, the stimuli on each trial were selected in a random
order. Second, each study-test cycle consisted of one mini-block
of eight study items followed by one mini-block of eight test
items. This resulted in a maximum possible lag between repeated
stimuli being 14 trials and the minimum being zero, with an
average lag of 7 intervening trials. We reduced the length of the
intervening trials to increase the sensitivity of the experiment, as
there is evidence that priming effects are stronger with reduced
lags (Henson et al., 2004). Third, each mini-block was preceded
by an instruction display, which informed the participants which
hand (left or right) they should use to perform the task in the
subsequent trials. If the correct hand to use was the left hand,
they had to press either the “w” or the “e” key (the response
keys designated for left hand responses) for the next mini-block
to start. If the correct hand to use was the right hand, they
had to press either the “o” or the “p” key (the response keys
designated for right hand responses) to proceed. In total, each
participant was presented with eight ‘hand-same’ study-test cycles
interwoven with eight ‘hand-change’ study-test cycles. In the
‘hand-same’ cycle, the same hand was used at study and test (four
left hand and four right hand cycles). In the ‘hand-change’ cycle,
the response hand was changed from study to test (four left to
right and four right to left cycles). These four combinations were
randomized and presented an equal number of times to each
participant.
Design and Procedure
The experiment used a 2 (task: word vs. math) × 2 (condition:
same vs. change) within-subjects design. The order of the task
was counterbalanced, with half the participants completing the
word task first, and the other half completing the math task first.
As in Experiment 1, each trial began with a fixation display
for 1,000 ms followed by the task display for 120 ms, and then
a blank screen until response. After every eight trials, based on
instruction, the participants either used the same hand to respond
or switched to a different hand. For right hand responses, the
participants pressed the same keys as in Experiment 1, i.e., the “o”
key for “odd” or “animal,” and the “p” key for “even” or “object.”
For left hand responses, they pressed the “w” key for “even” or
“object,” and the “e” key for “odd” or “animal.” Before the start
of the experiment, the participants were instructed to place both
hands on the keyboard, with the relevant fingers resting on the
four response keys. All the other aspects of the procedure were
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TABLE 3 | Means of median reaction times, expressed in milliseconds (ms), and
percentage of errors (%) for the classification of words and equations in
Experiment 2.
Reaction time (ms) Percentage error (%)
Study Test Study Test
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Word hand-same 630 84 590 64 3.9 3.2 3.1 3.6
Word hand-change 626 76 591 67 4.8 5.4 3.8 4.7
Math hand-same 1,245 312 1,159 273 9.6 6.4 7.8 4.9
Math hand-change 1,213 302 1,158 254 9.3 6.1 9.2 5.7
the same as those in Experiment 1. The entire experiment took
about 45 min to complete.
Results and Discussion
The data were treated in the same way as that in Experiment 1,
and this excluded less than 2% of the data. Five participants’ data
were not included in further analyses, three due to high error
rates (exceeding 25% in one or more conditions) and two due to
long RTs (more than 3 SD above the average of the median RTs
for all participants).
Table 3 shows the means of median RTs and error rates in each
condition. As in Experiment 1, we calculated the difference scores
between the study and test blocks, and Figure 4 shows the means
of the difference scores in RTs.
Two 2 (task: math vs. word) × 2 (condition: same vs. change)
repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted, one on the error
rates and the other on the RTs, again using the difference
scores between the study and the test blocks. The intercept was
significantly different from zero in both accuracy, F(1,21)= 4.94,
MSE = 15, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.19, and RTs, F(1,21) = 28.46,
MSE= 9020, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.57, indicating more accurate and
faster performance at test than at study. The main effect of task
in RT was marginally significant, F(1,21) = 4.09, MSE = 5965,
p = 0.06, η2p = 0.16, suggesting a larger difference between the
study and test blocks in the math task (70 ms) than in the word
task (38 ms). As in Experiment 1, this difference was due to longer
RTs in the math task (1,184 ms) than in the word task (609 ms).
FIGURE 4 | RT differences between the study and test blocks as a function of
condition in Experiment 2. Error bars show ±1 standard deviation of the
mean.
In terms of percentage change from study to test, this equated to
a 6% improvement in RT in each task. No effect of task was found
in the error rates. Importantly, there was no significant main
effect of condition, or task by condition interaction, in either
error rates or RTs. These results indicate that a change in hand
between the study and test blocks did not reduce the magnitude
of RP in either the word or the math task.
Once again, a similar pattern of data was found between the
word and math tasks. Participants showed significant priming
in both tasks, and a change in response hand did not affect
the magnitude of priming in either task. These results provided
converging evidence to the finding of Experiment 1, which also
showed comparable performance between the word and math
tasks.
The absence of a response congruency effect in motor action
in the word task may appear to be inconsistent with previous
studies that showed a reduction in priming when a change in
motor action occurred. Using a study-test block design, Horner
and Henson (2009, Experiment 6) showed participants pictures of
objects, and the task in the test block was to respond whether the
object was bigger than a shoebox by pressing one of two response
keys for a “Yes” or “No” answer. In the study block, there were
three conditions: the same action/same decision condition, in
which both the action (i.e., keypress responses) and the decision
(i.e., Yes/No answer) were the same as those in the test block;
the different action/same decision condition, in which the same
Yes/No task as in the test block was performed with verbal
responses; and the different action/different decision condition,
in which the task was to name the target object verbally.
Compared to new stimuli, priming was significantly larger in
the same action/same decision condition than in the different
action/same decision condition, which in turn was larger than in
the different action/different decision condition. Thus, priming
was reduced when there was a change in motor action or a change
in decision (see also Dobbins et al., 2004, for a related finding).
There are many methodological differences between Horner
and Henson’s (2009) experiment and Experiment 2 in the
present study. These differences include the type of stimuli
(objects vs. words), response decision (yes/no vs. animal/object),
presentation duration (2,000 ms vs. 120 ms), motor action
(verbal/keypress vs. keypress only), and the method of data
analysis (absolute difference vs. relative difference), among
others. Although the exact cause for the difference in results
is unclear, a possible candidate that might contribute to the
different results between the two experiments could concern the
manipulation of motor action, which was between verbal and
keypress responses in Horner and Henson (2009), but between
left and right hand responses in the present experiment. It
is possible that our manipulation of response hand was not
sufficiently sensitive to elicit the effect of a change in motor action
on RP between study and test. It is conceivable that a change
in motor action requires more attentional resources when the
change is large (e.g., from a hand response to a verbal response)
than when it is small (e.g., from a left hand response to a right
hand response). As attention strengthens binding (Logan, 1990;
Treisman, 1992), the S–R binding should be stronger in the
former case than in the latter case. Consequently, all else being
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equal, a response congruency effect is more likely to manifest in
RP when the change in motor action is between different response
modalities as in Horner and Henson’s (2009) study than when
the change is within the same response modality as in the present
experiment.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main goal of this study was to investigate and compare
the effects on behavioral priming of altering the color or the
response hand for repeated, otherwise identical, stimuli in a word
and a math task using a within-subjects design. Using a novel
arithmetic categorization task, our results indicate that a single,
brief, task relevant experience with an arithmetic equation affects
subsequent performance over an average lag of 15 intervening
trials. This result extends previous findings (e.g., Salimpoor et al.,
2010) to a new computationally challenging task within the
domain of mathematical cognition.
No previous studies had used a within-subjects design to
directly compare the magnitude of RP in a predominantly
linguistic task with a task that requires arithmetic computation.
Using a within-subjects study-test block design, we asked
participants to complete both a word and a math task. Our results
show that the magnitude of RP was comparable between the two
types of task, and that changing a task irrelevant object feature
such as color or the hand to respond had a negligible effect on RP
in either task.
The lack of a color congruency effect in Experiment 1 can be
explained in one of several ways. First, when a task at test required
only conceptual processing, priming occurred at a semantic level
rather than at the level of perceptual features. This indicates that
priming operates at the level of processing at which the task is
directed (Schacter, 1990), a result consistent with the principle
of transfer-appropriate processing (Morris et al., 1977; Blaxton,
1989; Roediger et al., 1989). Thus, for a perceptual discrimination
task, perceptual features will be primed, while for a conceptual
categorisation task, semantic features will be primed (Jacoby,
1983; Kirsner et al., 1986; Schacter, 1990). Second, color did
not bind with the identity of the stimulus because it was task
irrelevant (Hommel, 1998). The sense that color was irrelevant
was likely to be enhanced by the use of 12 different color values
in Experiment 1, and this led to the observed absence of a
perceptual congruency effect in color. It has been suggested that
binary manipulations elicit a mutual inhibition effect, where the
activation of one feature serves to inhibit the activation associated
with the opposing feature (Hommel, 2009). According to this
account, the use of two colors (i.e., red and green) creates a
competitive interaction where repeating a word in red results
in a behavioral advantage from both the facilitation of red and
the inhibition of green, and this interaction is conducive to
the manifestation of RP. In the present study, such a mutual
inhibition effect was not elicited, as there were a dozen different
color values.
It is also possible that color and identity did not bind because
color was simply ignored. This is likely because a single color
was mapped to multiple stimulus identities in our study, and
this one-to-many mapping might have encouraged participants
not to attend to color. As the strength with which features are
bound depends on attention (Logan, 1990; Treisman, 1992), an
ignored feature may be precluded from the binding process,
especially when stimulus displays are presented very briefly,
which was the case (120 ms of target presentation duration)
in Experiment 1. Finally, color did bind but was not available
upon retrieval. Whereas the identity of stimuli was retained over
multiple intervening trials, the delay may have been too long for
the binding of color and identity to survive, in line with the claim
that a delay in the repetition of an S–R pairing can lead to decay
in the strength of binding (Hommel, 1998).2 In the present study,
the decay may start quite early, partly due to the use of multiple
colors, and partly to the one-to-many mapping between color and
stimulus identities. Both factors would weaken the strength of the
binding if binding between color and stimulus identity occurred.
Although each of the above interpretations can account for the
absence of the perceptual congruency effect in Experiment 1, it is
likely that the observed result was caused by more than one of the
reasons stated above.
Previous research using numbers as stimuli has shown that
changing task irrelevant features can affect the magnitude of
priming in some situations but not in others. Naccache and
Dehaene (2001) reported no reduction in priming in a masked
prime-probe number categorisation task (probe smaller or larger
than “5”) regardless of whether the prime and probe matched
in notation (Arabic digit vs. word). Using a study-test block
design that required participants to perform a two-operand
arithmetic task, Sciama et al. (1999) found attenuated priming
in the notation change condition compared to the notation same
condition when the numerals in the test blocks were presented in
atypical notations such as in words or dot configurations. These
results were attributed to atypical notations requiring additional
attentional resources for arithmetic tasks, and the demand of
attention in turn enhanced ‘form-specific’ associations. In the
present study, we used Arabic digits in both the study and test
blocks. Our results are thus generally consistent with previous
studies.
The factors we discussed in relation to color change
in Experiment 1 can also apply to the results concerning
hand change in Experiment 2. One may wonder whether
response hand can be considered as a task irrelevant feature
in Experiment 2. After all, the use of the correct response
hand was an important requirement in the experiment. That
being said, it is important to remember that the task in
Experiment 2 was still about the semantic concept of the
target stimuli, that the same hand was used within each
mini-block of eight trials, that the participants had as much
time as they needed to prepare the hand change before
2Unfortunately, we were unable to assess this statement empirically due to
insufficient number of trials when the data were broken down into separate lags
in the present study. In Experiment 1, each condition consisted of 32 trials. If
we broke down the data into short (0–9 intervening trials), intermediate (10–19
intervening trials), and long (20–29 intervening trials) lags, each lag would only
have an average of 10 trials after error trials were excluded. This prevented us
from estimating participants’ performance as a function of lag in a meaningful way.
A similar situation applies to the data in Experiment 2.
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each mini-block, and most important, that the participants
would no longer need to be concerned about which hand to
use once a mini-block of trials started. This is because they
would already be using the correct hand to respond at the
beginning of any mini-block of trials as they first had to press
one of the correct response keys designated for the correct
hand (left or right) to terminate the response instruction display
so that the experiment could proceed. Taking all of these
into account, it seems reasonable to consider response hand
as being a task irrelevant feature in Experiment 2, similar to
color being a task irrelevant feature in Experiment 1. If this
reasoning is correct, then the lack of a response congruency
effect in Experiment 2 could be due to priming occurring at
an abstract semantic level in accordance with the behavioral
goal, the failure of binding between stimulus identity and
motor action, and/or the decay of the binding from study to
test.
The participants in both Experiments 1 and 2 showed
comparable RP in the word and math tasks when a task irrelevant
feature such as the color of a stimulus or the hand used to make
a response changed from study to test. However, caution must
be taken to generalize the present findings to other variables.
As neither color nor the response hand change influenced the
magnitude of RP in the present study, it is unclear whether
comparable RP would still be found in a word and a math
task if the variables manipulated had a significant effect on RP
in one or both tasks. Future studies comparing the effects of
RP in the two types of tasks should select a variable known
to affect RP in a word and/or a math task. For example, to
determine the effect of a perceptual feature on RP across the
two tasks, instead of manipulating color, one can manipulate
surface form, perhaps using a familiar font (e.g., Times New
Roman) at study but an unusual font (e.g., ) at test.
Similarly, to investigate the effect of motor action, instead of
manipulating response hand, one can vary response modality
(e.g., a hand response vs. a verbal response). As there is
evidence that changes in surface form (Sciama et al., 1999) or
response modality (Horner and Henson, 2009) can influence
RP, one would expect a reduction in RP in the word and/or
the math task. If the magnitude of reduction is similar in both
tasks, this will provide converging evidence to the findings
in the present study that the magnitude of RP is comparable
in a predominantly linguistic task and in a task that requires
arithmetic computation.
With regard to whether the RP observed in our experiments
is best explained in terms of a facilitation account or a
retrieval based S–R binding account, our results are equivocal.
On the one hand, a facilitation account appears to be
sufficient in accounting for the present results. The lack of a
congruency effect in either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2 is
consistent with the notion that RP in the present paradigm
was driven by faster stimulus identification of repeated words
or equations at a semantic level irrespective of task irrelevant
object features or motor action. There was no evidence of an
interaction between different stimulus features or between a
stimulus feature and response. The improved performance for
repeated stimuli can thus be the result of facilitated neural
processing, which may manifest as an overall reduction in the
amplitude of neuronal activation (Dragoi et al., 2002; Kohn
and Movshon, 2003), a sharpening of response tuning in local
networks of neurons (Wiggs and Martin, 1998; Freedman
et al., 2006), more rapid onset of neural activation (James and
Gauthier, 2006), and/or lowered activation threshold (Morton,
1979).
On the other hand, the lack of a response congruency effect
cannot rule out an S–R binding account. As we discussed before,
it was possible that binding between stimulus identity and motor
action had occurred but did not survive the intervening trials.
It was also possible that stimulus identity was simultaneously
bound to multiple response codes. Horner and Henson (2009)
identified three levels of response codes: the motor action level
(e.g., left or right hand used in response), the decision level (e.g.,
a yes or no response), and the task-specific classification level
(e.g., a bigger than or a smaller than question). They showed that
each level can contribute to S–R binding. As we only manipulated
motor action in our study, it was conceivable that the binding
between identity and the other two levels of response code
remained intact between the study and test blocks. Hence, no
reduction in RP was found.
In summary, using a within-subjects design, we showed a
remarkable similarity in the pattern of priming between a word
and a math task, both when there was a color change and a
response hand change. These results extended previous findings
in mathematical cognition, and provided supporting evidence for
the proposal that priming does not vary with stimulus domain
(Ashcraft and Battaglia, 1978; Ashcraft and Stazyk, 1981) and
that mathematical and linguistic information relies on a common
representative structure (Scheepers et al., 2011; Scheepers and
Sturt, 2014).
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